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This manuscript describes a prelirninap stud) examining judgments of authors and 
reviewers regarding manuscripts that ha\e been either accepted or rejected for publication. 
Consistent with hjpotheses, results reveal that participants believe that their o\vn manu- 
scripts are superior to others' manuscripts in terms of general. theoretical. and mrthod- 
ological qualit?. Relevant to the presumed tendencq among reviewers to .s/re.n /imir/n,q 
mpeclc of nfanimripf (  (SLAM).  revieuers exhibited greater agreement 14ith editorial 
decisions favoring rejection. relative to those favoring acceptance. These findings suggest 
that authors' beliefs in reviewers' tendencies to S L A M  can be partially understood in 
terms o f  authors' unrealisticall) favorable and optimistic beliefs regarding their nianu- 
scripts and in reviewers' actual tendencies to be quite critical-at least more critical than 
editors. 
Virtually all sciences rely on the peer-review system. a practice that has been 
discussed by various scientists. While there is a good deal of agreement among 
scientists of different disciplines regarding the overall utility of the peer-review 
system, few (if any) believe that the peer-review system is without limitations 
(e.g., Laband & Piette, 1994; Peters & Ceci. 1985). 
Recently, Epstein ( 1995) fostered further debate regarding the peer-review 
system, noting that reviewers tend to place particular emphasis on (often seem- 
ingly correctable) imperfections and limitations, rather than on the innovative 
aspects of a manuscript. He summarized a discussion with fellow scientists (sev- 
eral of whom were associate editors who had many publication credits in APA 
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journals and who did a considerable amount of reviewing themselves) by noting 
that ‘‘I was impressed by the widespread discontent with the journal review pro- 
cess in this select group. Some of the terms people used to describe the reviews 
were ‘arbitrary,’ ‘biased,’ ‘self-serving,’ ‘irresponsible,’ and ‘arrogant”’ (p. 884). 
Epstein (1995) further illustrated such “biases” among reviewers by suggest- 
ing that reviewers frequently exhibit an “I gotcha” mentality, a frame of mind in 
which reviewers are tempted to recommend rejection on the basis of minor limi- 
tations, even in case of an otherwise excellent manuscript (for similar observa- 
tions, see Rabinovich, 1996). Are reviewers really that bad? Does this belief in 
what I refer to as reviewers’ tendencies to SLAM (an acronym for stressing limit- 
ing aspects ofmanuscripts) reflect an unbiased, accurate judgment? Or might this 
belief be colored by authors’ tendencies to interpret reviews (and reviewers’ 
inclinations) in ways so as to maintain a favorable view of one’s own manu- 
script?3 
While the belief in reviewers’ tendencies to SLAM seems to be shared by 
many researchers, Levenson (1996) pointed out that it is common for authors to 
engage in rationalization after reading reviews of their manuscripts, particularly 
those reviews that favor rejection rather than acceptance. He referred to this phe- 
nomenon as the sour-grapes hypothesis, stressing the notion that reviewers’ ten- 
dencies to SLAM are, to some degree, constructed beliefs. Indeed, i t  is unlikely 
that reviewers themselves describe their reviews in terms of SLAM. It is even 
less likely that reviewers themselves describe their reviews as “‘arbitrary,‘ 
‘biased,’ ‘self-serving,’ ‘irresponsible,’ and ‘arrogant”’ (Epstein, 1995, p. 884), 
as Epstein’s fellow scientists characterized reviews. Instead, it is more likely that 
reviewers believe that their (negative) appraisals are entirely justified, in light of 
what are believed to be serious limitations underlying the work they reviewed 
(e.g., “The theory was poorly developed,” “The studies were so poorly 
designed”; cf. Levenson, 1996). Thus, it is possible that the belief in reviewers’ 
tendencies to SLAM represents an objective reality, a constructed reality, or both. 
A Preliminary Study of Author and Reviewer Judgments 
In light of the preceding discussion-and given that the accumulation of 
knowledge relies to a significant degree on the peer-review system-it becomes 
important to examine the experiences of authors and reviewers. The present 
3Unfortunately, the acronym SLAMmay have some specific connotations that I do not intend to 
convey. For example, one connotation might be that reviewers are merely interested in providing 
authors with negative feedback. Of course, I do not use this acronym because of such harsh connota- 
tions, which in my view provide a very poor and inaccurate description of reviewers’ motivations. 
Nevertheless, I believe that this acronym captures the global meaning that I wish to convey: (authors 
believing that) reviewers stress limitations more than they do strengths. I thank an anonymous 
reviewer for suggesting this acronym. 
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manuscript describes a preliminary study. designed to enhance our understanding 
of (a) hou authors judge the quality of their own manuscripts that have been 
either accepted or rejected for publication. (b) how such judgments relate to Judg- 
ments of others’ manuscripts that have been either accepted or rqjected for publi- 
cation, and (c )  the extent to which authors and reviewers agree or disagree with 
editorial decisions favoring acceptance and re.jection. Specifically, this research 
asks several social psychologists to think of the most recent manuscript that they 
submitted (vs. reviewed) and that has been accepted (vs. rejected) for publica- 
tion. Thereafter. they are asked to judge the general quality, theoretical quality, 
and methodological quality of the manuscript and to indicate how much they 
agree with the editorial decision. 
Our frameLvork for understanding experiences of authors and reviewers 
regarding the peer-review system proposes that evaluations of own and others’ 
work to some extent are socially defined and colored by relatively stable beliefs 
of superiority. assuming that one‘s o m  u.ork is better than and not as bad as oth- 
ers’ work. This proposition may be derived from classic and contemporary 
assumptions underlying theories of social comparison and self-other judgment, 
which emphasize the social and self-enhancing nature ofjudgments, particularly 
in contexts in which perfectly objecti1.e standards for judgment are not available 
(cf. Festinger. 1954: Suls & Wills. 1991 : Taylor & Brown. 1988). Accordingly, 
the perceived quality of o u n  manuscripts may be partially affected by the good 
and bad features believed to be associated with others‘ manuscripts (e.g.. “This 
paper is actually quite good. when I look at what is being published these days”). 
Similarly, the perceived quality of others’ manuscripts may be partially affected 
by the good and bad features believed to be associated with own manuscripts 
(e.g.. “Compared to my own work. this \vork does not seen1 to be all that 
novel”). 
Congruent u ith these theoretical approaches. there is considerable e\ idence 
that judgments of others are affected by beliefs about the self (and vice \ .ma) ,  and 
that individuals tend to regard themselves as being better than average on several 
competence-related attributes (Suls & Wills, 199 1 : Taylor & Bromn. 1988; see 
also Allison, Messick, & Goethals. 1989; Van Lange & Rusbult. 1995). This evi- 
dence suggests that people have developed relatively stable views of the self, fre- 
quently referred to as positiLz self-scl7ema.r (Taylor & Brown, 1988), 14 hich may 
be used to interpret, filter. and color neu self-relevant information. In part. such 
information processing is guided by sr!fl,,7/7,i7cer?ier7f. the motivation to elexite 
the positivity of one’s self-conceptions and to protect one‘s self-concepts from 
negative evaluation. Also. such information processing might be guided by self- 
\.erification, the motivation to maintain consistency between self-conceptions and 
new self-relevant information (SLvann. 1983, 1990; see also Sedikides & Strube, 
1997). Indeed. if  people already hold beliefs of self-other superiority, seff- 
enhancement and self-verification are highly complementary mechanisms. 
THE SLAM EFFECT IN PEER REVIEW 2553 
Importantly, given that beliefs of superiority may to some degree serve as an 
anchor for evaluating others’ work-and given that it is not easy to compete with 
such standards-we as reviewers are likely to take a fairly critical approach to the 
work of others, thereby stressing the limitations rather than the strengths of the 
manuscripts we review. For example, consciously or unconsciously, we as 
reviewers may sometimes be tempted to recommend rejection on the basis of the 
(implicit but often disputable) belief that the limitations of the work we review 
are (far) more serious than the limitations that others have stressed regarding our 
own work.4 It is also interesting to note that by communicating experiences 
regarding “they as reviewers” and “we as reviewers,” we are likely to confirm 
our beliefs of superiority. 
Most of our colleagues can probably relate to the feeling that reviewers of our 
work (particularly work that has been rejected) can be somewhat biased or short- 
sighted and to the feeling that we as reviewers every now and then devote time to 
very poor manuscripts. Accordingly, the belief in reviewers’ tendencies to SLAM 
is likely to represent an objective reality (i.e., on average, reviewers do place par- 
ticular emphasis on limitations) and a constructed reality (i.e., authors do hold 
unrealistically favorable beliefs about their own research). 
Hypotheses: Beliefs of Superiority and Beliefs in Reviewers’ 
Tendencies to SLAM 
On the basis of the preceding lines of reasoning, three hypotheses are 
advanced. First, it is predicted that social psychologists will evaluate their own 
manuscripts more favorably than those of others in terms of general quality, theo- 
retical quality, as well as methodological quality. Second, perceptions of superi- 
ority may also to some extent affect the degree to which authors and reviewers 
agree or disagree with editorial decisions. Accordingly, it is predicted that for 
manuscripts being accepted, levels of agreement with the editorial decision will 
be greater for own manuscripts than for others’ manuscripts. Conversely, for 
manuscripts being rejected, levels of agreement with the editorial decision should 
be lower for own manuscripts than for others’ manuscripts. 
“owever, evaluations need not always be socially defined or colored by beliefs of superiority. 
For example, sometimes it is not difticult to evaluate a manuscript, in that its quality is unequivocall! 
excellent or unequivocally poor. Under such circumstances, our evaluations do not tend to be socially 
defined, although such review experiences may activate further reasoning that can be understood in  
terms of beliefs of superiority. For example, an unequivocally poor manuscript may help researchers 
to maintain a relatively favorable view of their own work (e.g., “Even my worst manuscript is better”; 
cf. downward comparison, Wills, I99 1 ). And, an unequivocally excellent manuscript may instigate 
somewhat exaggerated beliefs about the author of this manuscript (“This researcher must be a 
genius”; cf. Alicke, LoSchiavo, Zerbst, & Zhang, 1997). so that reviewers are still able to believe that 
their own work is quite good. Thus, evaluations may be socially defined and affected by beliefs of 
superiority, especially in the important gray area. ranging from not particularly good to quite good 
manuscripts. 
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Finally, this research seeks to provide evidence relevant to notion that the 
belief in reviewers' tendencies to SLAM to some degree reflects an objective 
reality. However. i t  is not easy to provide direct evidence in  support of this 
notion. How can one judge that revie\vers are actually too critical? Ho\v can one 
judge that reviewers "overstress" limitations? This issue is approached by exam- 
ining reviewers' levels of agreement regarding accept versus re.iect decisions 
taken by the editor. thus employing the editorial decision as a benchmark for 
assessing reviewers' tendencies to favor rejection rather than acceptance. 
Granted, this benchmark is indirect, in that the relationship between perceptions 
of limitations and recommendations for rejection (\\bile pronounced) is unlikely 
to be perfect. At the same time, this benchmark does take account of the low 
acceptance rates. a standard which is likely to inspire some tendency to SLAM 
among reviewers and editors (cf. Reis & Stiller. 1992). Thus, based on the 
assumption that the belief in SLAM among reviewers to some degree reflects an 
objective reality, i t  is predicted that reviewers will tend to agree more M ith edito- 
rial decisions favoring rejection than with editorial decisions favoring accep- 
tance. 
Method 
Participants were recruited at t\vo major conferences of social psychology, 
including a conference ( in  Washington, DC, in  September 1995) jointly orga- 
nized by the Society of Experimental Social Psychology (SESP) and the Euro- 
pean Association of Experimental Social Psychology (EAESP). and a conference 
held in Gmunden (Austria, in July 1996) organized by the EAESP. At both con- 
ferences, questionnaires \vere distributed, which participants could complete 
either during the conference (and drop in a designated box) or after the confer- 
ence (and mail to the university). Three weeks after each conference, a total o f54  
questionnaires was returned (26 questionnaires for the SESPiEAESP joint meet- 
ing; 28 questionnaires for the EAESP conference). 
In light of the large number of social psychologists who attended these con- 
ferences (i.e., both conferences were attended by at least 300 social psycholo- 
gists), the response rate is, of course. not ideal (even when one takes into account 
the fact that a fair number attended both conferences). However, an impressive 
response rate was not anticipated, for two reasons. First, participants of confer- 
ences receive a fair amount of material and tend to be quite busy during confer- 
ences. Second. many participants indicated that they wanted to participate, but 
could not do so because they had not yet served as reviewers for a peer-reviewed 
journal or had not yet published papers. Also, given that participants from two 
different conferences were recruited, I was able to see whether there might be 
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any substantial differences as a result of sample or selection differences. Exami- 
nation of possible differences between the two samples for both principal 
dependent measures (i.e., quality judgments and level of agreement with the edi- 
torial decision) reveals no evidence for any significant main or interaction effects 
involving “type of conference.” Thus, there is some (albeit indirect) support for 
the generality of our findings. 
Of the 54 questionnaires returned, 6 could not be used. That is, 1 question- 
naire contained several missing values, 2 questionnaires indicated that these par- 
ticipants had not yet submitted papers that were accepted for publication, and 3 
questionnaires indicated that these participants had not yet served as reviewers 
for a peer-reviewed journal. The remaining sample of 48 participants (35 men, 12 
women, 1 failed to indicate gender; A4 age = 42 years) consisted of social psy- 
chologists working in various countries, including Austria, Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, England, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Israel, the Netherlands, Swe- 
den, Portugal, the United States, New Zealand, and Wales. The sample consisted 
of 42 professors ( 1  7 full professors, 16 associate professors, 9 assistant profes- 
sors), 3 participants were post-doctoral research fellows, and 3 were graduate stu- 
dents. All of the participants had submitted manuscripts to social psychological 
or related journals and had served as reviewers for peer-reviewed journals. 
Experimental Design 
This study employs a 2 x 2 (Author: Own Manuscript vs. Others’ Manu- 
script x Editorial Decision: Accept vs. Reject) between-participants design. The 
dependent measures include (a) judgments of general quality, theoretical quality, 
and methodological quality of a submitted paper; and (b) level of agreement with 
the editorial decision. 
Procedure 
The first page of the questionnaire, entitled “The Social Psychology of 
Social Psychologists,” describes (a) the purpose of the research in very general 
terms (i.e., examining experiences of social psychologists), (b) anonymity of 
participants’ responses, and (c) debriefing procedures. To ensure anonymity and 
to provide the possibility for debriefing, I asked participants to return stickers 
with their names and addresses in a different box at the registration desk. At the 
SESP/EAESP joint meeting, the questionnaire consisted of different parts, 
examining issues such as descriptions of interaction situations at the conference, 
and evaluations and judgments of person talk (e.g., gossip). Because these top- 
ics were not central to the current research, they will not be discussed further. At 
the EAESP conference, the questionnaire examined only judgments of manu- 
scripts. 
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As noted earlier, there were four conditions. based on the factorial crossing of 
author ( o n n  vs. others' manuscript) and editorial decision (accept vs. reject). In 
the own-manuscript-accept condition. the instructions read, "For the questions 
below u e  would like to ask you to think about the empirical paper that you most 
recently si/hmi/tec/ US primat:13 m ~ h o r  /o  a peer-reviewed journal and that has 
been accepted for publication." In the others'-manuscript-accept condition, the 
phrase siihniittetl LIS primat;i* cruthor- t o  was replaced M.ith rei~ieic,et/,fi)t.. In  the 
rejection conditions (i.e.. own-manuscript-rqiect and others'-manuscript-rqject 
condition). the \\ord accep/etl was replaced \vith rrjrcrrd. 
In total, eight questions were asked. These questions focused on evaluations 
of a paper in its first submitted version so as to yield comparahle judgment situa- 
tions for the two author conditions (o\vn \ s .  others' manuscript). That is. review- 
ers typically do not ha\,e access to information relevant to the quality of a 
subsequent revision. whereas authors do. A first submitted version tends to differ 
in a number of aspects from a revision of this first draft. For example. relative to 
the first submitted paper. a revision of that paper is associated with improved 
quality (or at least the perception thereof) and a stronger awareness of the 
strengths and limitations of the study or studies described. Thus. to avoid such 
asymmetries in evaluations of own and others' manuscripts, I examined evalua- 
tions ofthe first submitted version. 
Five questions focused on judgments of quality. First, this research assessed 
ratings of general quality ("Ho\v v.ould you rate the overall quality of the paper 
in its first submitted \,ersion?") on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 ( iw: i .poor)  to 
7 (excellent). Second, two questions assessed ratings of theoretical quality of the 
paper ("How nould you rate the theoretical aspects of the paper in its first sub- 
mitted version?" Lvas rated on the same 7-point scale as the one for general qual- 
ity; "To what estent uere  there theoretical ambiguities in the paper [e.g.. logic 
was not entirely clear; a theoretically relevant link \\as missing]?" Lvas rated on a 
7-point scale ranging from I [/het.e i i ' ew  r n o ~ 7 ~ ~  amhigi,ities] to 7 [ / h e w  were no 
arnhigziities]). The correlation betneen these t\\ o ratings was fairly high. r(48) = 
.69, so the average ofthese t \ io  ratings \vas used in subsequent analyses. Third, 
using the same wording and scales as for the assessment of theoretical quality, 
this research assessed two ratings of the methodological quality of the paper (the 
illustration for methodological ambiguities was "incomplete information regard- 
ing procedure or analyses"). The correlation bet\veen these two ratings was fairly 
high, ~ ( 4 8 )  = .67. so the average of these t\vo ratings \+as used i n  subsequent 
analyses. A final question assessed degree of agreement with the editorial deci- 
sion by asking participants to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the edi- 
torial decision on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 ( I  disagree complete!,,) to 7 ( I  
agree complete!, 
I also asked each participant whether he or she would be willing to share 
the name of the journal that had accepted or rejected the manuscript. The most 
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frequently listed journals were Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
(JPSP; 14 times) and Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (PSPB; 16 
times). In a highly qualitative manner, I explored whether these two titles were 
about equally distributed over the four conditions. It appeared that JPSP was 
listed at least twice in each condition, and PSPB was listed at least once in all 
four conditions. Although this evidence is clearly impressionistic, it did not seem 
to be the case that the quality of the journals varied substantially across the four 
conditions. 
Results 
The analyses proceeded in two stages. To begin with, the hypotheses regard- 
ing quality judgments and level of agreement with the editorial decision were 
tested using a series of 2 x 2 (Author x Editorial Decision) ANOVAs. However, 
as the reader will note, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated 
(i.e., standard deviations varied significantly across differing cells). Even when 
the data are transformed (i.e., square-root transformation or log transformation), 
the standard deviations among cells were significantly different. Although para- 
metric tests such as ANOVA tend to be fairly robust to violations of the assump- 
tion of homogeneity, nonparametric tests are arguably more appropriate. The 
results of the ANOVA will nevertheless be reported because I regard the reality 
comprising differences in means and standard deviations to be substantially 
meaningful. Moreover, ANOVAs focusing on one of the two groups of partici- 
pants (i.e., joint SESP/EAESP meeting participants and EAESP conference par- 
ticipants) yielded identical findings, but only occasionally revealed a significant 
violation of the assumption of homogeneity. After describing the results of ANO- 
VAs, I report the results of a series of loglinear analyses, for which this assump- 
tion is irrelevant, thus complementing the ANOVA with statistically more 
appropriate tests of my hypotheses. 
Are Own Manuscripts Perceived to Be Superior to the Manuscripts We 
Review? 
I submitted the three ratings of quality (general, theoretical, and methodolog- 
ical) to a 2 x 2 (Author: Own vs. Others’ Manuscripts x Editorial Decision: 
Accept vs. Reject) MANOVA. This analysis reveals a significant multivariate 
main Effect for author, F(3, 42) = 5.26, p < .005, which at the univariate level 
reveals a significant effect for general quality, F( 1,44) = 14.18,~ < .001; theoret- 
ical quality, F( 1, 44) = 1 1.52, p < .OO 1 ; and methodological quality, F( 1, 44) = 
10.88,~ < .005. As can be seen in Figure 1, results illustrate that, relative to oth- 
ers’ manuscripts, own manuscripts were rated to be superior in terms of general 
quality (Ms = 3.80 vs. 5.2 1, respective SDs = 1.64 and 0.69), theoretical quality 
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Figure 1. Judgments of quality regarding own and others’ manuscripts. 
(Ms = 3.60 vs. 4.96, respective SDs = 1.63 and 0.85), and methodological quality 
(Ms = 3.90 vs. 5.27, respective SDs = 1.73 and 0.78). 
Not surprisingly, the analysis also reveals a significant multivariate main 
effect for editorial decision, F(3, 42) = 2.95, p < .05, which reflects a main effect 
for general quality, F( 1 ,  44) = 5.6 1. p < .05; theoretical quality, F( I ,  44) = 5.15, 
p < .05; and methodological quality, F( 1, 44) = 8.1 1. p < .01. Relative to manu- 
scripts that were rejected, manuscripts that were accepted for publication were 
rated to be superior in terms of general quality (Ms = 4.13 vs. 5.08, respective 
SDs = 1.42 and 1.15). theoretical quality ( M s  = 3.89 vs. 4.86, respective SDs = 
1.41 and 1.25). and methodological quality (Ms = 4.09 vs. 5.26, respective SDs = 
1.34 and 1.28). No further effects were significant. 
Could it be that we believe that our own rejected manuscripts are not inferior 
to the manuscripts that we have reviewed and that have been accepted for publi- 
cation? Specific contrasts reveal that own rejected manuscripts were believed to 
be at least as good as were others’ manuscripts that have been accepted. None of 
the contrasts were significant, and the means for general quality (Ms = 5.09 vs. 
4.63, respective SDs = 0.71 vs. 1.77), theoretical quality (Ms = 4.77 vs. 4.38, 
respective SDs = 0.90 vs. 1.85), and methodological quality (Ms = 4.91 vs. 4.75, 
respective SDs = 0.66 vs. 1.95) indicate that we certainly do not regard our own 
rejected manuscripts as inferior to others’ accepted manuscripts. 
As noted earlier, the standard deviations among cells were substantially dif- 
ferent, as revealed by significant Bartlett-Box tests for judgments of general 
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quality, F(3,2903) = 4 . 4 8 , ~  < .01; theoretical quality, F(3, 2903) = 2 . 8 3 , ~  < .05; 
and methodological quality, F(3,2903) = 4 . 7 2 , ~  < .005. For each judgment, the 
standard deviations were smaller for judgments of own manuscripts (i.e., SDs 
ranged from 0.66 to 0.91 across both conditions) than for judgments of others’ 
manuscripts (i.e., SDs ranged from 1.3 1 to 1.85 across both conditions). Thus, 
irrespective of whether own manuscripts were accepted or rejected, almost all of 
the participants believed that their work was at least quite good (i.e., none of the 
participants’ ratings of general quality were smaller than the midpoint of the 
scale). In contrast, there was considerable variation in quality judgments regard- 
ing others’ work (i.e., 10 ratings were below the midpoint and 8 were above the 
midpoint of the scale). 
To examine the three judgments of quality in a statistically appropriate man- 
ner, three 2 x 2 x 2 (Quality: High vs. Low x Author x Editorial Decision) loglin- 
ear analyses were conducted. In each analysis, judgments of quality (i.e., general, 
theoretical, and methodological quality) were dichotomized by comparing rat- 
ings of 4 or lower (i.e., low quality) with ratings that exceeded this midpoint of 
the scale (i.e., high quality). Paralleling our earlier main effects for author, all 
three analyses reveal a significant interaction of author and quality: general qual- 
ity, x2( 1, N = 48) = 9.47, p < .005; theoretical quality, x2( 1,  N = 48) = 12.10. p < 
.001; and methodological quality, x2( 1, N = 48) = 7.67, p < .O 1. 
Results reveal that 24 of 28 participants (86%) considered their own work of 
high general quality, whereas only 8 of 20 participants (40%) considered others’ 
work of high general quality (40%). Similar effects were found for judgments of 
theoretical and methodological quality. A majority (23 of 28 participants, or 
82%) considered their own work of high theoretical quality, whereas only 6 of 20 
participants (30%) considered others’ work of high theoretical quality. Similarly, 
24 of 28 participants (86%) considered their own work of high methodological 
quality, whereas only 9 of 20 participants (45%) considered others’ work of 
high methodological quality. None of the analyses reveal any other significant 
effects, except for a main effect of quality in the analyses of general quality, x2( I ,  
N = 48) = 5.44, p < .05, and methodological quality, x2( 1, N = 48)  = 6.92, p < .05, 
indicating that a small majority regarded the overall quality to be high (i.e., a 
small majority exhibited above-midpoint ratings for general quality [67%] and 
methodological quality [69%]). Thus, these analyses, too, are consistent with our 
hypothesis stating that participants believe that their own manuscripts are supe- 
rior to others’ manuscripts in terms of general quality, theoretical quality, and 
methodological quality. 
When Do We Agree and When Do We Disagree With Editorial Decisions? 
Levels of agreement with editorial decisions were submitted to a 2 x 2 
(Author: Self vs. Other x Editorial Decision: Accept vs. Reject) ANOVA. This 
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Figure 2. Levels of agreement with editorial decisions favoring acceptance or rqjection of 
own and others' manuscripts. 
analysis reveals an interaction of author and editorial decision, F( 1, 44) = 30.84, 
p < .001, and no significant main effects. As can be seen in Figure 2, simple effects 
reveal that for manuscripts being accepted, levels of agreement were greater for 
own manuscripts (M = 6.53. SD = 0.62) than for others' manuscripts (A4 = 4.75, 
SD = 2.3 1 ), F( 1,44) = 12.54. p < .00 1 .  Conversely, for manuscripts being rejected, 
levels of agreement were lower for own manuscripts ( M  = 3.55, SD = I .69) than 
for others' manuscripts (M= 6.33, SD = 0.99), F( 1,44) = 22.86, p < .001. 
Do we as reviewers exhibit lower levels of agreement with editorial decisions 
favoring acceptance than those favoring rejection? Consistent with hypotheses. 
simple effects reveal, for others' manuscripts, greater levels of agreement for 
rejected manuscripts ( M  = 6.33, SD = 0.99) than for accepted manuscripts ( M  = 
4.75, SD = 2.31), F(1,  44) = 6.89, p = .01. Of lesser relevance (although congru- 
ent with our hypotheses), simple effects for own manuscripts reveal greater levels 
of agreement with editorial decisions favoring acceptance ( M  = 6.53, SD = 0.63) 
than those favoring rejection (M = 3 . 5 5 ,  SD = 1.70). F( 1,44) = 29.54, p < .001. 
As was the case for judgments ofquality, the variances among cells were sub- 
stantially different, as revealed by a significant Bartlett-Box test, F(3, 2903) = 
6.80, p < .001. Unlike the pattern for quality judgments, for level of agreement, 
variances were substantially lower when own manuscripts were accepted or 
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when others’ manuscripts were rejected (both SDs < I ,  as noted earlier) than 
when own manuscripts were rejected or when others’ manuscripts were accepted 
(both SDs > 1.69). Thus, for own accepted manuscripts and for others’ rejected 
manuscripts, almost all of the participants exhibited very high levels of agree- 
ment with the editorial decision. 
As in the analyses of quality judgements, the association among variables 
was analyzed using a 2 x 2 x 2 (Agreement: High vs. Low x Author x Editorial 
Decision) loglinear analysis. Given that the overall levels of agreement were 
fairly high, I compared ratings of 5 or lower (i.e., low agreement) with ratings 
that exceeded 5 (i.e., high quality), resulting in a more equal distribution than the 
one determined by the midpoint of the scale (even though 65% exhibited ratings 
greater than 5). Paralleling our earlier interaction of author and editorial decision, 
this analysis reveals a significant three-way interaction of agreement, author, and 
quality, x*( 1, N = 48) = 19.82, p < .OOl .  For own manuscripts, a large majority 
( 16 of 17 participants, 94%) indicated high agreement with acceptance, whereas 
for others’ manuscripts, a large majority ( 10 of 12 participants, 83%) indicated 
high agreement with rejection. Indeed, a specific follow-up analysis focusing on 
manuscripts that the participants had reviewed (i.e.. others’ manuscripts) reveals 
a significant association between agreement (high vs. low) and editorial decision, 
xz( 1, N = 20) = 4.43, p < .05. Thus, these analyses, too, are consistent with our 
hypotheses, stating that (a) participants exhibit greater levels of agreement with 
acceptance of own versus others’ manuscripts, and lower levels of agreement 
with rejection of own versus others’ manuscripts; and (b) for others’ manuscripts, 
participants exhibit greater levels of agreement with editorial decisions favoring 
rejection than those favoring acceptance. 
Links Between Perceived Quality and Agreement 
Congruent with the assumption that quality judgments affect levels of agree- 
ment with editorial decisions, results reveal that for accepted manuscripts, greater 
levels of perceived general quality, theoretical quality, and methodological qual- 
ity were associated with greater levels of agreement (respective rs  = .46, 3 4 ,  and 
.64, all p s  < .lo). Conversely, for rejected manuscripts, greater levels of per- 
ceived general quality, theoretical quality, and methodological quality were asso- 
ciated with lower levels of agreement (respective rs = -.57, -.60, and -.60, all ps < 
.01). Thus, agreement with editorial decisions seems to be partially based on 
judgments of theoretical as well as methodological quality. 
Discussion 
The current study provides good evidence in support of the claim that 
social psychologists tend to hold superior beliefs about their own manuscripts, 
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ascribing greater quality (i.e.. general quality. theoretical quality, and method- 
ological quality) to the manuscripts that they have submitted than to the manu- 
scripts they have reviewed. Moreover. levels of agreement with an editorial 
decision were greater for own (vs. others’) manuscripts that have been accepted 
for publication; conversely, levels of agreement with an editorial decision were 
greater for others’ (vs. own) manuscripts that have been rejected for publication. 
And in the role of reviewers. participants exhibited greater agreement with edito- 
rial decisions favoring rejection rather than acceptance. suggesting that reviewers 
are more critical than are editors. 
Generally, these findings are consistent with the assumption that judgments 
of own and others’ work to some extent are socially defined and colored by rela- 
tively stable beliefs of superiority: processes that can be understood in terms of 
self-enhancement and self-verification. When submitting manuscripts. many of 
us would seem to be somewhat unrealistically optimistic. believing that the odds 
of acceptance are (much) greater than the base rate (cf. Weinstein, 1980). We 
may continue to hold favorable beliefs about the quality of own manuscripts that 
have been rejected by filtering specific positive information (i.e., typical editorial 
letters and reviews do contain at least some positive comments) and (to some 
extent) downplaying the quality of reviews. Also, in evaluating own and others’ 
work, we may tend to assign greater attention and weight to specific domains 
or criteria that are of special importance to us or that we ourselves excel in (cf. 
Dunning. Meyerowitz, & Holzberg. 1989). At the same time, the present research 
cannot rule out one potentially important alternative interpretation. It may be that 
reviewers submit manuscripts that are actually of greater quality than are the 
manuscripts that they review. Indeed. not all authors serve as reviewers for peer- 
reviewed journals, whereas all participants of this study had reviewer experience. 
As such, the present findings cannot unambiguously be attributed to self- 
enhancement or self-veri tication mechanisms. 
The major thrust of this study was not its theoretical relevance, but its rele- 
vance to understanding judgments of own and others’ work in the context of the 
current peer-review system, an issue that has not yet been truly explored. Indeed, 
one major question was whether the belief in reviewers’ tendencies to SLAM 
represents an objective reality, a constructed reality, or both. Part of the answer is 
located in our tendencies to hold unrealistically favorable beliefs regarding our 
own work, thereby supporting the constructed reality underlying the belief in 
reviewers’ tendencies to SLAM (as well as Levenson’s, 1996, sour-grapes 
hypothesis). At the same time. the current findings suggest (albeit indirectly) that 
reviewers do tend to recommend rejection on the basis of limitations that would 
seem to be somewhat less serious in  the eyes of editors. Reviewers’ appraisals 
tend to be more negative than those of editors, in that reviewers exhibited greater 
levels of agreement with editorial decisions favoring rejection than with editorial 
decisions favoring acceptance. Thus, another reason for why authors sometimes 
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might be upset is that reviewers factually place particular emphasis on the limita- 
tions of a manuscript, thereby supporting the objective reality underlying the 
belief in reviewers’ tendencies to SLAM. 
Why exactly might reviewers be overly critical; at least more critical than edi- 
tors? What are important differences between reviewers and editors? To begin 
with, reviewers typically tend to have greater expertise regarding the issues 
addressed in a manuscript than do editors. However, greater expertise and knowl- 
edge do not necessarily imply a greater emphasis or recognition of limitations, in 
that such additional knowledge could also be associated with a greater ability to 
detect strengths and innovative aspects of a manuscript. 
A second explanation is that, given that the base rate for acceptance tends to 
be quite low within the field of social psychology, reviewers may become 
inclined to recommend rejection rather than acceptance. For example, in light of 
this base rate, reviewers may believe that their job is to detect limitations and 
only occasionally to recommend acceptance. Also, scientists may wish to avoid 
writing reviews that are expected to deviate significantly from other reviews (cf. 
Asch, 1955). Given the low base rates for acceptance, the likelihood of being 
deviant would be greater if one recommends acceptance than if one recommends 
rejection. Also, it may be psychologically more aversive to deviate by recom- 
mending acceptance than by recommending rejection, particularly if reviewers 
see their role as one of pointing out limitations rather than strengths. 
A final explanation may be derived from the fact that in the current peer- 
review system, editors (unlike reviewers) are accountable. Editors are not anony- 
mous, and editors are the ones whose (negative) decisions might be challenged 
by the author. Thus, it would seem to be particularly important for editors to care- 
fully attend to both limitations and strengths of a manuscript, whereas reviewers 
are in a position where they can “almost freely” focus on limitations, rather than 
strengths. 
Turning back to Epstein (1995), it is interesting that one of his major sugges- 
tions for improving the review system focuses on increasing reviewer account- 
ability by providing authors with standard forms for evaluating the reviews that 
they receive. This suggestion is considered to be useful by Fine (1  996), who also 
argues that it would be essential that such forms be completed after a final deci- 
sion is made on the revised manuscript in order to enhance honest evaluations of 
the reviews. As pointed out by Fine, Epstein’s suggested procedure may (a) ele- 
vate review quality; (b) strengthen helpfulness among reviewers; and (c) help 
authors to feel less dependent on incompetent, biased, or inexperienced review- 
ers. Moreover, if successful, this procedure may (d) help editors to select capable, 
constructive, and “balanced” reviewers; and (e) give rise to norms for assessing 
quality on the basis of limitations and strengths. 
Thus, there is good reason to believe that Epstein’s (1 995) suggested proce- 
dure is a useful one (even at the expense of some practical costs). However, this 
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procedure raises at least two questions. First, it is important to keep in mind that 
editors need reviewers’ honest evaluations and judgments to make a balanced 
editorial decision. Although enhanced reviewer accountability is likely to result 
in “more balanced” reviews, it is not clear whether accountability strengthens or 
diminishes such honesty. Given that this research was anonymous and not rele- 
vant to editorial decisions, there are no strong reasons to question the partici- 
pants’ honesty regarding their evaluations of manuscripts that they had reviewed 
(evaluations which actually were quite critical). Thus, although Epstein’s proce- 
dure is likely to encourage balanced reviews, the potential risk is that the review- 
ers tend to be not only less critical but also less honest than they might be when 
they are less accountable, as in the current peer-review system. 
A second issue raised by Epstein’s ( 1995) suggested procedure is whether 
authors will provide reviewers with fair and useful comments. Although it is 
possible that such comments are quite fruitful, as suggested by Fine (1996), it is 
also possible that authors are somewhat unable (or unwilling) to provide “their 
reviewers” (particularly negative reviewers) with fair and useful feedback. The 
current findings indicate that authors continue to hold very favorable beliefs 
about their manuscripts, even after the work has been rejected for publication 
(i.e., beliefs that were at least as favorable as beliefs about others’ work that has 
been accepted). This finding is understandable, in that ( a )  i t  is common for 
researchers to have considerable faith in their contributions (i.e., based on own 
logic and own observations); (b) researchers are likely to submit their work to a 
particular journal, anticipating that this work will be fairly well received (i.e., 
typically, authors do not submit their work to journals from which they expect a 
rejection); (c) the base rates for acceptance are low: and. last but not least. (d) it 
is not easy for many of us to dissociate the quality of our work from our sense of 
self-esteem. Thus, in light of the finding that authors continue to believe that 
their rejected manuscripts are quite good. it is-at least to some degree-ques- 
tionable whether authors are able or willing to provide the reviewer with fair 
and useful feedback. Similarly, given that reviewers tend to be quite critical of 
others’ work. i t  is somewhat questionable whether reviewers will consider 
authors’ comments (particularly somewhat critical comments) to be fair and 
useful. 
Clearly, the current research is not without limitations. The sample relied on 
generosity and interest of the participants, and included only social psychologists 
with review experience. These unfortunate (yet to some degree inevitable) fea- 
tures limit the scope of this research and make it impossible to rule out alterna- 
tive interpretations that may be derived from selection bias. Despite these 
limitations, the findings suggest that, for both good and bad reasons, we as 
authors may, every now and then, be disturbed about some detailed questions and 
doubts expressed by reviewers; whereas we as reviewers may offen truly believe 
that such questions and doubts are accurate, appropriate, and usehl. 
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